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Classically, the ‘commodity question’ was conceptualised as having two elements. The first was 
commodity price volatility. Volatility’s macro-economic implications were noted as a matter of 
concern – albeit only for industrialised countries - by Keynes as early as 1942.
2  The second was 
decline in relative prices, an issue first raised by Prebisch and Singer in 1950. Prebsich (1950) and 
Singer (1950) went onto argue that volatility and relative price decline were linked, via reference to 
the notion of inelascity in demand for commodities. According to these authors, this contrasted with 
the elasticity of demand enjoyed by manufactures, thus implying declining relative prices. On the 
other hand, price instability around a declining trend was induced via the interaction of inelastic 
demand with a supply position that was potentially highly variable. Production of commodities 
occurred to some extent independent of demand for them, as a result of accidents of nature as well as 
of the tendency for price increases to generate over-investment in producing countries. 
 
The Prebisch-Singer analysis still forms the basis for most common understandings of the 
‘commodity question’ today. However, the last decade has seen a widespread acceptance of the 
proposition that the question also includes a third element, namely oligopolistic market structures on 
the demand side. Concentration amongst Northern-based international traders, processors and retailers 
is today mentioned as a critical dimension of the commodity question not merely by producing 
country governments and concerned NGOs, but also by the World Bank (cf. Lewin, Giovannucci and 
Varangis 2004) and the European Commission (2004). 
 
This paper reviews more and less mainstream policy options in relation to the ‘commodity question’ 
in the light both of its classical definition and of the emerging concern about oligopoly. It begins by 
updating the evidence concerning commodity price decline and volatility, and examining the 
implications of these phenomena for macro-economic performance and livelihoods in producing 
countries. It then turns to the issue of oligopoly, where it considers evidence on market concentration 
and on monopsonistic behaviour. This is followed by a discussion of the main policy options in the 
area which have received high levels of attention from international donors since the beginning of the 
21
st century (although some of these have longer histories). These options are compensatory financing 
mechanisms; assistance for diversification; price risk management instruments; and private or public-
private commodity specific initiatives directed at promoting ‘fairer’, more responsible or simply more 
remunerative trade. The paper then turns to what might be called an ‘alternative’ policy agenda on 
commodities. This agenda is not a systematic platform, but rather a series of proposals emanating 
from producing country governments, development NGOs and more heterodox-inclined academics. 
The agenda covers reconstitution of international commodity agreements; global regulation of 
oligopolistic behaviour; elimination of subsidies to Northern producers and ‘buying out’ of Northern 
producers; support to improved market coordination in producing countries and simplification of 
smallholder compliance with commodity standards; and actions on the demand side in the North.  
 
Throughout, the main focus is on a specific agro-commodity, namely coffee. This is because this 
product has been the subject of more recent documentation, analysis and policy proposals than any 
other. However not all agro-commodities resemble coffee, either in respect of historical forms of 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Stefano Ponte and Frantzeska Papadopoulou-Zavalis for comments on this draft. The usual caveats apply. 
2 Keynes’ (1942/1980) concern was that commodity price rises on inflation levels, on short-term movements of capital, 
and thereby on economic cycles generally. He proposed an ‘International Clearing Union’ to finance buffer stocks in 
response.   3
international market regulation, or current market structure, or relevant policy options. For this reason, 
a secondary focus on cotton will be provided.
3  
 
Declining commodity prices and their implications for economies and livelihoods 
 
Agro-commodity prices have been declining throughout the 20
th century, but for most commodities 
this decline has accelerated in the last twenty years. Between 1982 and 2002, international prices for 
both coffee and cotton declined by over 50% in real terms and in both cases have been recently at 30-
year lows. Cotton, and particularly coffee, prices are also subject to high levels of volatility. The most 
obvious reason for price decline is a growing imbalance between supply and demand. Dramatically 
increasing coffee supply-demand imbalances date back to the collapse of the International 
Commodity Agreement governing its trade in 1988-89. In the case of coffee, it is supply that has 
increased substantially, mainly on the basis of new production in Brazil and Vietnam, while aggregate 
demand has changed little. In the case of cotton, which was never governed by an International 
Commodity Agreement, supply has been fairly stable but demand has contracted, as synthetic fibres 
have replaced natural ones in textile production.
4 
 
The phenomena of stable or increasing supply in the face of declining prices is partly related to low 
costs of production in certain countries. In the case of coffee, Vietnam’s production costs appear to be 
low enough to provide incentives to increase Robusta output even at current prices. Meanwhile 
Brazilian coffee producers can now cultivate Natural Arabicas at lower costs than has been the case 
historically, on the basis of the adoption of new farming systems. In the case of cotton, producers in 
Brazil have again been also able to cultivate profitably under current price conditions. Both coffee and 
cotton production in Brazil, as well in the important state farm coffee sub-sector in Vietnam, is 
organised on the basis of large estates. Here, previously unattainable economies of scale in input use, 
irrigation, use of farm machinery and transport/marketing can be all now realised. 
 
By implication, precipitous price decline has impacted primarily on countries and regions dominated 
by smallholder production systems. Within many of these systems, and against the expectations of the 
architects of market reform, costs to producers have risen with the widespread liberalisation of 
national input markets. Inputs in many of these countries are no longer purchased and distributed in 
bulk and public subsidies have been removed from their local prices. Probably more significantly, the 
transaction costs of smallholder output marketing have risen dramatically, with the abolition or 
disintegration of parastatal or large-scale cooperative export marketing organisations. 
 
Macro-economic effects 
It is noteworthy that those countries most dependent on agro-commodities in regard to aggregate 
export revenue are virtually all smallholder-based agro-commodity producers. In the late 1990s there 
were nine developing countries for which coffee represented 23% or more of export earnings
5 (Lewin, 
Giovannucci & Varangis, op. cit., 8)), and five for which cotton represented 34% or more
6 (Gillson et 
al 2004). In all but one of these 14, smallholder production systems dominate (the exception is 
Uzbekistan for cotton). At the same time, most of the largest aggregate exporters of these crops – 
                                                 
3 No discussion of mineral commodities will be undertaken. 
4 Between 1960 and 2000, but accelerating in the 1990s, the share of synthetics in total fibre consumption rose from 22% 
to 59% (Gillson et al 2003, Appendix 10). 
5 Burundi 79%, Ethiopia 64%, Uganda 59%, Rwanda 56%, Sierra Leone 32%, Nicaragua 27%, El Salvador 24%, 
Guatemala 24% and Honduras 23%. 
6 Benin 65%, Burkina Faso 45%, Uzbekistan 45%, Mali 42%, Chad 34%, Togo 23%.   4
particularly coffee – have been much less macro-economically exposed to price decline. The share of 
coffee exports in the total export earnings of Brazil and Vietnam, for example, is only around 3% in 
both cases. In 1998-2002, 19 coffee-exporting countries were more macro-economically exposed to 
price declines than Vietnam, and 20 more exposed than Brazil (Lewin, Giovannucci & Varangis 
ibid.). 
 
Humphrey (2004), using IMF data, makes the complementary point that – as a result of their higher 
levels of commodity dependence - low-income (and mostly smallholder system-based) commodity-
exporting countries are more likely than developing country commodity exporters to experience both 
price shocks and terms of trade shocks.
7  Over the period 1981-2001, 30 low-income countries 
suffered a total of 204 price shock episodes of an average magnitude of 20%. However, while low-
income countries were 13% more likely to experience a price shock than other developing countries, 
they were 60% more likely to experience a terms of trade shock.  
 
Price shock effects are important since they bear directly on GDP, while terms of trade effects bear 
directly on balance of payments. Kruger, Mason & Vakis (2003) have calculated that for the five main 
coffee producing countries of Central America
8, the international coffee price decline of 1999-2001 
alone led to a 1.2% drop in GDP for the countries as a group, without taking into account multiplier 
effects. 
 
Implications for welfare in rural areas 
The implications of agro-commodity price changes for rural welfare in low-income countries has 
received only patchy attention in recent years, relative to influences such as access to infrastructure, 
health status and exposure to civil disorder. However, a current literature exists for coffee and cotton 
examining the relation between such price changes, the incidence of rural poverty and specific 
outcomes for the poor. 
 
International coffee prices rose during the period 1992-97 and even in 1999 remained considerably 
above their 1992 level. Deininger and Okidi (2003) report the effects of this development in Uganda, 
which emerged as a major producer of Robusta during this period, on the basis of a panel of 1,200 
households monitored from 1992-2000. They conclude ‘a first finding is that price changes for 
Uganda’s main tradable product, coffee, had a strong impact on improved growth and…also benefited 
the poor, as confirmed by evidence that many small producers were able to enter the coffee market’. 
Rural households below the poverty line fell from 54% (1992) to 36% (2000), with the highest falls 
occurring in coffee-dependent areas, and with a ‘significant and quantitatively large’ element of this 
change deriving from higher coffee prices. To test whether the poor benefited specifically from these 
price changes, the authors interacted coffee price changes and initial household assets, finding a 
negative and significant relation. This result stands in contrast with the authors’ overall findings, 
namely that initial asset levels were otherwise of overriding importance in determining gains in per 
capita expenditure and income.  
 
National household panel data has been also used by researchers to trace the consequences of the (ca. 
60%
9) fall in the coffee price between 1998 and 2001, this time in Nicaragua (Kruger, Mason & Vakis 
                                                 
7 Humphrey follows the IMF’s definitions of price shocks as year-on-year declines in real export prices of at least 10% 
and terms-of-trade shocks year-on-year declines in terms of trade of at least 10%. 
8 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
9 Nicaraguan f.o.b. prices fell by 61% over this period. According to Kruger, Mason & Vakis (2003), farm gate prices in 
the country fell by 66%.   5
op. cit.). These authors focus on impacts on income and poverty, as well as on children’s schooling 
and nutrition. They show that, while hired labour in the coffee sector suffered high levels of 
retrenchment in the period (but was generally able to find employment in other sectors), the largest 
drops in income and welfare were suffered by smallholders. The incidence of poverty among 
households remaining in the coffee economy increased by 2% between 1998 and 2001, while the 
incidence of poverty declined by more than 6% for all rural panel households. Extreme poverty 
increased almost 5% for coffee households, while declining by 14% for the panel as a whole. 
Corresponding results were obtained on consumption and schooling (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Welfare changes and participation in coffee economy, rural Nicaragua 1998-2001 
  % change, 1998-2001 
type of household  poverty rate  per capita consumption  primary school enrolment 
rate 
non-coffee -15.6  +15.0  +9.6 
exited  -17.9 +15.2 +19.3 
entered -1.8  +1.3  +20.7 
coffee +2.4  -16.3  -7.0 
Source: based on Kruger, Mason & Vakis (2003) 
 
Estimating from data based on a large household level survey conducted in 1998, Minot & Daniels 
(2002) have conducted a parallel study to the one just described, this time in relation to the impact in 
Benin of the 40% fall in the international cotton price between January 2001 and May 2002. They 
report that, in the short-run, average income fell by 21% for cotton growers and 7% for farmers as a 
whole. The incidence of poverty amongst cotton growers increased from 37% to 59% and amongst all 
farmers from 40% to 48%. Absolute reductions in income were greatest for higher-income growers 
but all income categories showed similar percentage falls in per capita income. Fully 30% of those in 
the middle per capita income quintile fell below the poverty line. The authors also estimate long-term 
impacts, i.e. those which could be anticipated after growers adjust their production patterns. 
Interestingly, because of lack of clear diversification alternatives, the long-term response offsets only 
around one third of the original impact. Finally, the authors report their 1998 findings on the 
multiplier effects of cotton income. Because cotton-growing households were found to spend 70% of 
their income on purchasing non-tradables, this is considerable. A CFA Fr 1 decline in cotton income 
entails a total income loss of CFA Fr 3.3 to the national economy.
10 
 
Given the large size of the populations directly involved in agro-commodity production in low-
income countries, the large proportion of these populations falling below the poverty line, and the 
large multiplier effects of changes in income from these sources, it is clear that the price trends 




As noted earlier, a widespread awareness is evident of high and growing levels of oligopoly at the 
downstream end of agro-commodity chains. In some discussion this is linked, albeit rather loosely, to 
a related common observation. This concerns the (declining) share of final prices going to producing 
countries and/or producers. Certain schools of thought, notably ‘global value chain’ (GVC) analysis, 
                                                 
10 Bautista & Thomas (1999) report a smallholder cotton income multiplier effect of 1.92 in Zimbabwe.   6
seek to link these observations theoretically – in this case in through the notion of ‘buyer-drivenness’ 
(see e.g., Gibbon & Ponte 2005). 
 
Discussion of these issues is almost entirely absent in the case of cotton, however. Indeed, cotton is 
sometimes cited (including by Gibbon & Ponte, op.cit.) as an exception to the rule. In the cotton case, 
levels of downstream industrial concentration in cotton spinning (and beyond) are very low and even 
the international trader segment exhibits concentration only to a limited degree. In 1995, as many as 
19 international trading companies handled 200,000 tons of lint or more, jointly accounting for 35% 
of the global trade. By 2000 this share had increased, but only slightly, to 39% (Larsen 2004). Other 
dimensions of ‘buyer-drivenness’, such as fundamental changes in the division of labour along the 
chain and new ‘proprietary’ definitions of quality, are also only faintly evident. No studies of shares 
of final prices going to producers appear to have been carried out, presumably because of the 
difficulty in identifying what constitutes a relevant final product. 
 
Coffee is a different story. Although up to date information is hard to come buy, in 1998 the largest 
five coffee roasters (Philip Morris, Nestlé, Sara Lee, Proctor & Gamble and Tchibo) controlled 69% 
of the world market, while the largest eight international trading companies (Neuman, Volcafé, 
Cargill, Esteve, Aron, Man, Dreyfus and Mitsubishi) controlled 56% (Van Dijk et al, 1998).
11 More 
recent studies of western European markets suggest even higher levels of concentration in a large 
number of countries (Durevall 2003). Studies of shares of retail prices of roasted coffee going to 
producing countries and (less frequently) producers are also quite common. Figure 1 summarises 
these. 
 
Figure 1: Estimates of the distribution of shares of final retail price along the coffee chain 
Author (date)  Period covered  Type of coffee  Type of producer 
price (a) 
Type of final 
price (b) 
a/b (%) 
1970-79  all coffee  weighted c.i.f., ex-
all ICO producers 
weighted retail 
price, all ICO 
consumers 
20 
1980-88 ,,  ,,  ,,  20 
Talbot (1997) 
1989-94 ,,  ,,  ,,  13 
Fitter & 
Kaplinsky (2001) 
1989-98 ,,  ,,  ,,  14 
1995-01 all  coffee 
imported to US 
,,  US retail price  27  Strunning (2001) 
‘late 2001’  ,,  ,,  ,,  20 






EIU, reported in 
Lewin et al (2004) 
2002 ,,  ,,  ,,  <22 
Lewin, 
Giovanucci & 
1995  (i) all coffee 
imported to US 
weighted c.i.f., ex-
all ICO producers 




                                                 
11 In 2001 Philip Morris spun-off Kraft Foods, which was the vehicle for its coffee interests. Other developments include 
the sale of some brands between leading players.   7
(ii) all coffee 
imported to 
France 
(ii) retail price, 
France 
40  Varangis (2004) 
2001 (i)  all  coffee 
imported to US 
(ii) all coffee 
imported to 
France 
,,  (i) retail price, 
US 





Pelupessy (1999)  1994  (i) Côte d’Ivoire 
robusta 








(i)  13.8 
 
(ii)  14.6 
1999/2000  Uganda robusta  (i) farm gate 
(ii) fob Uganda 
(iii) cif Italy 
(iv) ex-roaster 
retail price, Italy  (i)  6.6 
(ii)  12.4 
(iii)  14.3 
(iv)  86.5 
,, Tanzania 
arabica 
(i) farm gate 
(ii) fob Tanzania 
(iii) cif Italy 
(iv) ex-roaster 
,, (i)  3.9 
(ii)  8.9 
(iii)  9.4 
(iv)  80.0 
Daviron & Ponte 
(2005) 
,, Tanzania  mid-
range espresso 
blend 
(i) farm gate 
(ii) fob Tanzania 




(i)  0.9 
(ii)  2.4 
(iii)  2.5 
(iv)  26.7 
Source: based on Ponte & Daviron (2004), supplemented 
 
The observations in these studies give widely dispersed values for f.o.b. and c.i.f. shares of final retail 
prices in Northern markets, particularly during the 1990s. However, the trend they depict is consistent 
and monotonic, namely that of a sharp decline between the 1990s and the present decade. If 2% is 
added to the f.o.b. prices reported in order to generate c.i.f. equivalents, the median value for all c.i.f. 
observations from 1989-1998 is 34.5%, while that for the period since 1999 is 19.0%. A much smaller 
number of observations for farm gate price-retail ratios also show a declining trend from the 1990s to 
the current decade. 
 
While these observations give implicit support to the hypothesis of oligopoly power, all except 
Daviron & Ponte’s leave open the question of whether this power is located with roasters or with 
actors downstream of them. The latter authors’ detailed price data suggest that both roasters and 
coffee house chains (though not retailers) possess the power to inflate their mark-ups. Gross mark-ups 
by roasters over the c.i.f. price are in a range of 81-89% of the ex-roaster price, whether they are 
selling-on to retailers or to coffee houses. Gross mark-ups by retailers are in a range of 20-25% of the 
retail price, which is low in comparison with other food product lines. Gross mark-ups by coffee 
houses are in a range of 70-80% of the coffee house price.
12 
 
                                                 
12 Daviron & Ponte also report price data for the chain for Tanzania peaberry Arabica into Starbuck’s and for two further 
Tanzanian blends into Italian retail. The ranges reported here are based on these data also.   8
Figure 2: Econometric studies of coffee market power 
author(s) period  covered  market  covered  method  findings  conclusion 
Roberts (1984)  1972  US roasting  estimation of level of 
oligopoly based on ratio of 
mark-ups to prices (Lerner 
index) 
Lerner Index 0.061 
(approximates pure 
competition) 
oligopoly hypothesis rejected 
Bhuyan & Lopez (1997)  1972-87  US roasting  as Roberts, but over longer 
period and in comparison to 
39 other US agro-food 
processing sectors. Also 
investigated overall 
correlation between 
oligopoly and returns to 
scale. 
Lerner Index 0.507, ranked 
8
th of 40. 
Returns to scale index 
1.433, ranked 9
th of 40. 
Significant overall 
correlation between 
oligopoly and returns to 
scale. 
oligopoly power confirmed 
Bettendorf & Verhoven 
(2000) 
1992-96 Netherlands 
roasting and retail 
(not disaggregated) 
as Roberts, but combined 
with consideration of price 
transmission in instances of 
upward raw material price 
movement and 
disaggregation of net mark-
ups. 
Lerner Index 0.539.  
Excess price transmission 
occurs when green coffee 
prices rise, by ratio of 1.7-
1.9.  
Net mark-up declines only 
marginally when gross 
mark-up falls. 
neither competitive market nor 
monopolistic one. Market 
instead characterised as 
exhibiting ‘oligopolistic 
interdependence’. 
Feuerstein (2002)  1971-95  Germany roasting 
and retail (not 
disaggregated) 
consideration of price 
transmission in instances of 
upward raw material price 
movement and 
disaggregation of net mark-
ups. 
no clear evidence of excess 
price transmission, although 
faster price adjustment 
occurs when green coffee 
price rises than when it falls. 
Net mark-ups unaffected by 
green coffee price increases. 
market power hypothesis 
rejected 
Koerner (2002)  1992-2000  Germany roasting 
and retail (not 
disaggregated) 
consideration of pricing 
behaviour in instances of 
upward raw material price 
movement and following 
mergers between roasters. 
Disaggregation of raw 
pricing behaviour does not 
change when demand rises. 
Pricing behaviour moves 
from ‘price war’ to normal 
competition following 
roaster merger. 
price behaviour a poor 
indicator of market power, 
since highly concentrated 
sectors may be characterised 
by ‘price war’   9
material and non-raw 
material costs.  
Disaggregation by coffee 
type. 
Increases in green Robusta 
and ‘Other Milds’ fully 
transmitted, increases in 
green Columbia Milds lead 
to substitution. 
Pricing below marginal cost 
occurs during certain 
periods (attributed to 
retailers) 
Durevall (2003)  1988-2001  Sweden roasting 
and retail (not 
disaggregated). 
Some coverage of 
other EU markets 
consideration of price 
transmission in instances of 
upward raw material price 
movement and 
disaggregation of net mark-
ups. 
excess price transmission 
evident when green coffee 
price rises, by ratio of 1.7 . 
Tendency for increase in 
green coffee prices to be 
more fully transmitted than 
decreases, but this not 
statistically significant. 
No evidence of pricing 
systematically above 
marginal cost. 
Net margins constant in 
long-term. 
Market power hypothesis 
rejected. But market 
nonetheless functions 
imperfectly.   10
The scale of coffee houses’ gross mark-ups, in relation to those of retailers, is counter-intuitive since 
levels of concentration in the food retail sector tend to be on a par with the roaster sector. By contrast, 
ownership of coffee houses is much more dispersed. Part of the answer to this puzzle may lie in the 
coffee house sector’s widely reported demand elasticity (in contrast to clear inelasticity of retail 




Econometric studies of market power in the agro-food sector have a longer history than that of the 
type of study just reviewed. In the process, the methodologies used have become complex and 
sophisticated. The two most common today are the so-called ‘New Empirical Industrial Organisation’ 
(NEIO) approach and the use of time series models. Empirically, the former focus on the relation 
between final prices and firm-level marginal costs as a measure of market power, while the latter 
measure market power in terms of ‘price transmission’ – levels of translation of input price changes 
into output price outcomes (taking into account elasticity of demand).
13 In both cases, highly detailed 
data is used, but normally in a standardised form (e.g., standard labour costs) based upon national 
price and consumption series. Little or no use is made of data collected directly at firm level. At least 
six econometric studies of market power in the coffee sector have been published in the last twenty 
years. These are summarised in Figure 2. 
 
Almost all the econometric studies listed reject or qualify the proposition of oligopoly power in the 
sense of fixing output prices without reference to input prices. However, the time periods they cover 
are overwhelmingly pre-1999 and their substantive focus is largely confined to episodes when green 
coffee prices were rising. The latter bias is a result of a common, but undemonstrated, theoretical 
assumption that it should be easier to inflate margins when prices rises than when they fall. Koerner’s 
(2002) study, reported in Figure 2, gives support to a somewhat different proposition. This is that 
green coffee price rises may lead to substitution of beans of higher quality by inferior ones, as much 
as or more than it leads to efforts to push up retail prices. Thereby, margins remain constant even if 
the spread between input and retail prices does not increase. By implication, if green coffee prices fall 
while revisions to blends are retained, margins can then increase in the absence of clear evidence 
concerning imperfect price transmission.
14 
 
A second issue is that time series model-based studies (the majority reported here) establish levels of 
price transmission on the basis of comparisons between roasters’ input prices and retailers’ (not 
roasters’) output prices to.
15 Given that the qualitative evidence in Figure 1 suggests that the main 
objective of retailers’ coffee pricing behaviour is to dilute the impact on consumers of roasters’ 
pricing behaviour, a major challenge to econometricians is to conduct time series studies isolating the 
roaster sector in the same way that earlier NEIO studies claim to have done. The econometric 
literature nonetheless does give some pause to the common conviction that oligopolistic market 
structures alone can be held responsible for producers’ falling shares of final income. Market 
concentration in the retail sector seems to be associated with strong competition, meaning that if 
oligopoly rents are being commanded, this is only by roasters.  
 
A final problem of the econometric literature is that it does not address the ‘why’ questions 
underlying its findings. Even if oligopolistic power could be demonstrated, it tells us little about 
                                                 
13 For a summing-up of these and other methodologies see Digal & Ahmadi-Esfahani (2002) 
14 This argument was suggested to me by Stefano Ponte. 
15 This problem is common to this school (with a few exceptions) and not confined to its treatment of coffee.    11
whether it emanates from market concentration alone or some other source. At the same time 
however, there is a more detailed empirical literature covering developments in the international 
coffee sector over the last decade that helps us identify some of the probable sources - other than 
industry concentration - for the trends in shares of final income going to different groups of 
participants levels described above. Pending time-series studies that succeed in focusing on roasters’ 
output as well as input prices, firm conclusions about oligopoly power cannot be drawn. If and when 
they can, it is this industry-focused literature that should form the basis for new hypotheses in the 
area. 
 
Lewin, Giovannucci & Varangis (op. cit.) disaggregate changes in roasters’ consumption of specific 
varieties of coffee in more detail, and over a longer period, than Koerner (op. cit.). They show a steep 
decline of the highest premium variety, Columbia Milds
16 in global consumption between 1993 and 
2002 (from 20.8% of total consumption to 13.6%). Consumption of the other variety historically 
commanding a premium, Other Milds, also fell (from 29.6% to 27.6%). By contrast, consumption of 
Robustas increased from 31.0% to 35.2% and Natural (unwashed) Arabicas from 18.6% to 23.7%.
17 
These changes reflect a high level of substitution of inferior for superior varieties in roasters’ blends, 
made possible by the adoption of simple technologies such as steam cleaning.
18 This trend can be 
understood as a capturing by roasters of some of the quality-based rent traditionally extracted by 
producers through exploiting agro-ecological advantages and following specific prescriptions on 
husbandry and post-harvest treatment. At the same time, as Daviron & Ponte (op. cit.) show, roasters 
and coffee houses have succeeded in adding new, largely immaterial, dimensions of quality to the 
final product (e.g., gourmet-ship, social and environmental welfare content and - in the case of coffee 
houses – new service dimensions including ‘ambience’), thereby adding new rents for themselves in 
the process. The first process depended to some extent on the collapse of the International Coffee 
Agreement, under which producing countries could control which varieties appeared in what volumes 
on the world market. This second process builds on this, since it involves a suppression of traditional 
(variety-related) conventions of quality in the sector.  
 
The processes implied in this account do not depend upon either active horizontal collusion or on 
imposition of explicit vertical restraints. Nevertheless, a real vertical constraint is introduced, since 
the market shrinks for coffees judged of premium quality according to traditional conventions. 
Furthermore, this rests on a new power balance, following the end of market regulation. 
 
 
Present donor approaches 
 
As noted earlier, the most frequently encountered current policy approaches to the ‘commodity 
problem’ amongst OECD countries are compensatory financing mechanisms, assistance for 
diversification, price risk management instruments, and private or public-private commodity-specific 
initiatives directed at promoting ‘fairer’, more responsible or simply more remunerative trade. These 
will be discussed in turn. 
                                                 
16 Grown not only in Columbia but in a number of other countries including Kenya and Tanzania. 
17 Easily the greater part of these changes occurred in the EU, where demand for Columbian (and Other) Milds was 
historically much greater than in the US. Columbian Milds’ share of the US market has fallen much less than in the EU 
also because of the rise of the ‘Specialty Coffee’ industry there over the last decade. 
18 Steam cleaning (subjecting the unroasted coffee bean to high pressure steam) generates not only less harshness in 
Robustas, but can also eliminate some acidity from Natural Arabicas, to produce a much milder taste. As often noted in the 
literature, the immediate stimulus to adopt steam cleaning arose from the short-lived green coffee price increases of the 
early 1990s.   12
 
Compensatory financing mechanisms 
Financing mechanisms aimed at compensating low income countries for the macro-economic impacts 
of price- and terms of trade shocks date back to the 1960s. In 1963, even though it did not accept the 
validity of the Prebisch-Singer thesis (Sapsford and Singer 1998), the IMF established a 
Compensatory Finance Facility to provide non-conditional balance of payment support to member 
countries experiencing sharp declines in commodity export earnings as a result of external shocks, and 
a Buffer Stock Financing Facility in 1969 to support governments’ contributions to International 
Commodity Agreements. Prior to mid-1980s both funds were drawn on extensively, despite their 
relatively high interest rates
19 - although most borrowers were middle-income countries. The EU’s 
STABEX, which was also designed for non-conditional support to ACP countries experiencing 
commodity price-related balance of payments problems, dated from the first Lomé  
Convention. Unlike with the IMF facilities, loans were interest free. A total of €1.3 bn. was disbursed 
during this period (EU Commission 1997). 
 
Sharply falling commodity prices in the early 1990s, following the demise of the International 
Commodity Agreements, led to major resource drains from the Compensatory Finance Facility and 
STABEX, mainly as a result both of increased eligibility for assistance. STABEX in particular 
threatened to distort EU lending as a whole. In 1990-91 the EU found itself committed to disburse 
€1.38 bn. to eligible applicants, three times more than had been reserved for this purpose, with the 
consequence that it was able to pay out only 42% of the sum due to eligible applicants during the next 
three years. Even so, STABEX disbursements rose to 13% of all EU aid (EU Commission 1997, Page 
& Hewitt op. cit.) under Lomé IV
20. At the same time, repayment rates collapsed. The EU responded 
in the short-term by converting existing STABEX loans to grants, but at the same time both it and the 
IMF linked further access to adjustment-style conditionalities. Both because of this, and the high 
interest rates involved, the Compensatory Finance Facility was hardly drawn on after 1989 and the 
Buffer Stock Financing Facility was last used in 1984 (IMF 1999). Meanwhile, under the Cotonou 
Agreement, the EU replaced STABEX with FLEX in 2000.  
 
FLEX’s eligibility criteria were more stringent than STABEX’s and the levels of real compensation 
they could trigger were lower. ACP countries had to register a year-on-year 10% loss in export 
earnings (2% in the case of LDCs) as well as a year-on-year 10% worsening of their programmed 
public deficit. Of 51 applications up to the end of 2002, only six were found to have met both these 
criteria, with the result that only €35.7 mn. was disbursed. This situation unleashed considerable 
criticism from ACP countries, with the result that the EU undertook a review of FLEX in 2003-04. 
The review proposed extending the 2% derogation to the first rule to landlocked countries and island 
states, and eliminating the second rule completely. No proposal was made regarding a revision of 
compensation levels. The EU Commission contended that, if the proposed criteria had been in place 
from the outset, a further 23 applicants would have been eligible. Some member states, led by the UK, 
objected to the review’s proposal on the grounds that the new criteria were too permissive and that 
insufficient controls were in place over how such funds could be used by beneficiaries. The 
Commission then agreed to reinstate the second rule, but with a trigger of a 2% rather than a 10% 
worsening in the programmed public deficit. It also reiterated that disbursements could only be used 
                                                 
19 Total drawings prior to 1999 from the Compensatory Finance Facility were SDR8.4 bn. (US$11.7 bn.) and from the 
Buffer Stock Financing Facility SDR0.56 bn. (US$0.78 bn.).  
20 According to Collier et al (1998) STABEX transfers accounted for almost a quarter of total government revenue in 
Ethiopia and Uganda during some years of this period.   13
by beneficiaries for purposes identified within the framework of EU Country Strategy Papers (UK 
Parliament 2004). 
 
In its review of FLEX the EU stated that a total disbursement of €255 mn. would have occurred 
during 2000-02, had its initially proposed changes in eligibility criteria been made. This implies an 
annual disbursement level of €85 mn., or around a third in nominal terms of that reserved under 
STABEX a decade earlier. Because of the revision of its 2002-03 proposals, actual disbursement 
levels are likely to be still lower. While compensatory finance can clearly play a positive role in 
mitigating the effects of falling commodity prices, the levels envisaged will have to be increased 
sharply if they are to have any impact. 
 
Assistance for diversification 
Donor support for diversification has also existed for a long period. In the 1970s and early 1980s this 
was largely in the form of finance and TA for downstream diversification in commodity sectors 
themselves (origin cocoa grinding, soluble coffee production, cotton spinning, etc). From the mid-
1980s, in the context of structural adjustment programmes, such support turned to diversification out 
of agro-commodities entirely. According to Morgan and Sapsford (1994) the multilateral development 
banks committed as much as 5% of their total loans in the second half of the 1980s to diversification 
projects, mostly away from rice and rubber (in Asia), and from coffee, cocoa, and palm oil (in Africa). 
However there was little donor coordination in this area, and estimates of this kind should be treated 
with caution.  
 
Today support for diversification continues, mainly in the form of promoting ‘non-traditional exports’ 
(NTEs) within the context of so-called Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA). Donor 
coordination in respect of TRTA has improved in relation to earlier initiatives in this area, but hard 
data on support for NTEs remains elusive. OECD-DAC provides data only for overall donor 
commitment levels in relation to the headings ‘trade promotion strategy and implementation’ and 
‘market analysis and development’, the bulk of which can be assumed to be targeted on NTEs. 




On the other hand, it is relevant to sound a few words of caution concerning the claims currently made 
for diversification into the most commonly-recommended group of NTEs, namely ‘higher-value 
agricultural (and fisheries) exports’. These range from medicinal herbs to dried fruits, but the most 
common emphases tend to be on fresh vegetables, flowers, exotic fruits and fish/seafood (see for 
example FAO 2001, para. 165 and ILO 2000, para 8). While the main benefits of diversification away 
from commodities in general are said to be reduced risk (for producers) and more stable export 
revenues (for countries), higher-value agricultural exports are also said to offer good prospects for 
long-term income growth by virtue of their relatively high income elasticities. Less frequently aired 
are the problems and difficulties associated with agro-export diversification, particularly for the many 
of the most commonly recommended products. The most obvious of these are described briefly 
below: 
 
Agro-ecological conditions. The constraints imposed on diversification by adverse agro-ecological 
conditions are most obvious in the case of cotton, which in many developing countries is grown by 
smallholders mainly in marginal areas as a sole cash crop. This has led to even leading figures in the 
                                                 
21 No data is available for disbursements. Commitments are recorded from 20 of the 23 OECD-DAC members, three non-
members and 16 multilateral organizations.   14
World Bank concluding that recommendations to diversify out of cotton are often facile (cf. Cleaver 
2002). Conversely, the extent to which it is practicable to cultivate some crops typically 
recommended as diversification options is also limited by agro-ecological conditions. Leguminous 
vegetables and flowers, for example, require more or less constant water availability. 
The nature of existing, ‘spontaneous’ forms of agricultural diversification. At least as far as 
smallholders are concerned, existing patterns of diversification are typically underestimated. Indeed 
they are so entrenched as to also constitute a barrier to further diversification. Diversification into a 
variety (often a wide one) of food crops is an extremely well-established means for smallholder to 
hedge risk. By contrast, cash-generating output is very often less than half of total output, leaving 
little scope for adoption of new cash crops (Eicher & Baker 1992)
22 
High transaction costs and related entry barriers. High transactions costs are perhaps the most 
important difficulty facing diversification into higher-value products however. As Delgado and 
Siamwalla (1997) point out, these arise partly from the relatively high costs involved in storing and 
processing such goods, and from the relatively specialised inputs that they require. Costs of 
monitoring quality are also very high however, and rise sharply with the increasingly common 
requirement that producers conform to ‘good agricultural practices’ and good processing ones such as 
HACCPs. Both because of the investment costs involved and the considerable economies of scale 
involved in monitoring quality, these sectors are characterised by high and escalating entry barriers 
that militate against participation by non-commercial farmers or fishers (except where regulations are 
enforced that prevent this occurring – compare in this respect Dolan & Humphrey (2001) on East 
African horticulture with Gibbon (2001) on the Lake Victoria export fishery). 
Adding-up problems (the ‘fallacy of composition’). A final issue, at least potentially, is that of ‘adding 
up’, i.e., the terms of trade implications for (e.g.) higher-value agro-exports when several countries 
increase exports simultaneously. This may lead to a combination of increasing demand but stagnant 
prices, or to falling prices if demand becomes stagnant. Unit price trends into the UK and France for 
four groups of vegetables and fruits commonly grown in tropical countries can be used as a proxy for 
the current extent of the price dimension of this problem.
23 
 
Table 2 Average unit prices (current c.i.f., €/kg.) for vegetables and fruit into UK and France, 1991-
2002 
Category  708 709 804 807 
  UK France UK France UK France UK France 
1991-94  1.97 1.51 1.46 0.92 1.08 1.03 0.60 0.67 
1995-98  2.12 1.51 1.60 0.96 1.01 0.92 0.64 0.61 
1999-02  2.37 1.49 1.75 1.04 1.19 1.01 0.71 0.64 
Key: 708 = Leguminous vegetables, shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled; 709 = Other vegetables, fresh or chilled (except 
potatoes, tomatoes, alliaceous vegetables, edible brassicas and lettuce); 804 = Dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, guavas, 
mangos and mangosteens, fresh or dried; 807 = Melons, watermelons and papayas, fresh 
Source: Eurostat, Comext data base 
 
                                                 
22 This is a variant of classic Chayanovian arguments concerning the problems of increasing production of single cash 
crops within peasant systems (for an early application to Africa, see Boesen & Mohele, 1979). 
23 The purpose of using data from both UK and France in Table II is not to generate a direct comparison of prices for the 
same categories of products between the two markets, but rather to examine historical trends in both. Direct comparison 
on price is problematic since the different versions of the same product groups are favoured in the two markets. For 
example, the majority of imports into France under category 708 have been bobby beans from North Africa, whereas the 
majority into the UK have been higher-value green beans from Kenya.   15
Even in a context when import levels were increasing extremely fast in each case (Eurostat, op. cit.)
24, 
prices can be seen to have roughly kept pace with inflation for only one category/country combination 
(708 into the UK). For three category/country combinations (all into France), they actually fell in 
nominal terms. These results are by no means as bad as those for coffee, cocoa and cotton, but as 
Humphrey (op. cit.) shows, they are worse than for certain temperate fruits (apples) and only 
marginally better than for other temperate fruits (citrus) and for tea (all cases where import levels 
were stable or declining).  
  
Price Risk Management (PRM) 
Following interest awoken by Varangis and Larson’s (1996) paper, the World Bank in 1999 launched 
a (public-private) International Task Force on PRM. The latter’s initial focus was on how to assist 
producing countries – particularly LDCs – to use futures markets. Futures markets have existed since 
the early 20
th century for most (but not all) agro-commodities.
25 Historically they have been used 
mainly by international traders – and by some large producers where these also trade internationally 
on their own account – in order to hedge risk. Speculators too have always played a role in these 
markets, which has accentuated price movement within them but also assured their liquidity.
26 Futures 
are legally binding contracts to buy (sell) specific volumes of specific commodities at a fixed price on 
a given day. To hedge his price risk over a season, a producer has to buy (or get to be issued) a 
contract that he will deliver X tons on day Y at price Z. If the price on day Y is Z-n then he has locked 
in a better price and can close the contract. If the price however is Z+n then he must sell his crop on 
the spot market for the better price and try to sell to someone else his contract to deliver at price Z. To 
do this he will forfeit a discount, which theoretically must be below n, although it should be 
reasonably close to it. Besides the hedge itself the main advantage to the producer is that, instead of 
holding the product as stock until the selling date or having to buy from others when the other party 
chooses to close the contract, he sells his own physical crop as and when he pleases and otherwise 
simply makes paper transactions. 
 
For reasons that have not been explicitly stated by proponents of this approach, since 1999 discussion 
of conventional futures contracts as the PRM instrument of choice has been displaced by discussion of 
put options, price insurance transactions and warehouse receipt-based finance – or rather, by a 
combination of these (cf. International Task Force website). A put option is a type of contract similar 
to a futures one, but in this case the seller – instead of having an obligation to close the contract on 
day Y - can close it at any time prior to day Y. Opening such a put option contract entails payment of 
a premium by the seller to the buyer, over and above the cost of opening a conventional futures 
contract. Price insurance transactions involve a speculative dimension mainly for the insurer, who 
guarantees the insured party a floor price and charges a premium reflecting his calculation of the risk 
of spot market prices departing from this floor price. The extent of the security of the hedge offered is 
directly reflected in the level of the premium. Warehouse receipt credit is credit issued by a financial 
institution against the collateral of a given magnitude of crop stored in a supervised warehouse, or in 
some circumstances against the promise of delivery of such a magnitude into such a warehouse.  
                                                 
24 By between 50 and 100% in six category/country combinations described in Table II and by more than 100% in the 
remaining two. 
25 See Cronon (1991) for an excellent discussion of the birth of these markets in the US. 
26 A debate exists concerning the extent to which the rise since 1980 of new classes of speculators (e.g., hedge funds) has 
contributed to increased price volatility in commodity futures markets. Mitchell and Gilbert (1997) concluded from a fairly 
detailed empirical study that the main impact of hedge fund activity has been to accelerate price movements, rather than to 
lend prices greater volatility. This is because hedge fund investment strategy seems to be based mainly on a consideration 
of market ‘fundamentals’. Pressures toward greater volatility have arisen too, but apparently mainly from the adoption 
new types of (‘trend’ and ‘technical’-based) investment strategies by smaller speculators.   16
 
In the current thinking of the International Task Force, developing country producers can engage in 
PRM through combining these three types of instrument, on the basis of inter-locking arrangements 
with international traders and local credit institutions. At the beginning of a season the international 
trader can buy or get issued a put option in a futures market, for a specific magnitude of crop at floor 
price Y. He can then insure this floor price for the producer-seller of this crop, by paying a premium 
on their behalf to an insurer. In such a case the trader will himself carry the majority of the risk 
concerning whether the producer-seller will repay the premium. The remainder of this risk can be 
borne by a local credit institution, against the producer-seller’s warehouse receipts (or promises 
equivalent to them). As far as is known, after years of preparation, the International Task Force has 
been able to set up two schemes of this kind, on a pilot basis and covering a total of a few thousand 
coffee producers in Uganda and Tanzania (Rabobank 2003). 
 
Limitations associated with the use of PRM in relation to developing country agro-commodities have 
been widely noted (e.g., Maizels 1994 and 2000, UNCTAD 1998, Page & Hewitt 2001, Murphy 
2002), without this having dampened enthusiasm for them to any noticeable degree. They include the 
fact that not all agro-commodities have derivative financial markets or that, in some cases such as 
cotton where they do exist they comprise contracts only for one national variety of the product
27; that 
such markets only cater for price and not volume risk (the latter is arguably as great); that the 
maximum period they can cover price risk for is rather short (a maximum of two years)
28; that they 
cannot be used to hedge commodity price premiums, as opposed to index prices; that the costs of 
using them (in terms of brokers’ fees, collateral when getting contracts issued, plus – where applicable 
– premiums for non-standard contracts such as put options) are high and in most cases subject to very 
considerable economies of scale
29; that users need to be in daily contact with financial markets in 
order to use them optimally; and that they require a high level of liquidity to do so (profits and losses 
are settled on a daily basis). These limitations point toward the conclusion that it is only likely to be 
very large-scale, volume-secure, credit-worthy and globally-oriented producers who will be able to 
make much use of such markets, in the absence of subsidies, technical assistance, donor-brokered 
financial intermediation or all three. Even players conforming to these characteristics will benefit 
from these markets mainly by price discovery and by reducing spot market losses, rather than by 
realising benefits from price increases. As for the behaviour of ‘real’ commodity markets themselves, 
these instruments are broadly neutral. Their role is to reduce the effects of price volatility for 
individual actors, rather than to reduce volatility in aggregate. 
 
Presumably, it was considerations concerning entry barriers and economies of scale which led the 
World Bank in the direction of sold-on price insurance rather than first-hand futures trading when it 
came to smallholder producers. But whether even this model can be operationalised without subsidies 
both to international traders and credit institutions is unclear. Certainly, the transaction costs of such 
                                                 
27 Only US cotton can be delivered against the New York futures contract. Some international traders have taken to 
hedging their non-US cottons by taking positions in the futures market, but this is a very imperfect hedge. 
28 In recent years, the actual length of available futures contracts has become much shorter than this, as spot have tended to 
replace forward contracts in the physical market in the wake of liberalisation. A representative of the commodities 
research group LMC International stated at the 1999 London Cocoa and Coffee Conference that the majority of coffee 
futures transactions were now in the first two or three positions (i.e., they represented futures of only 2-3 months’ 
duration). For coffee in 2004, six months’ duration was the longest position available. Most contracts for cotton are also 
concentrated in ‘nearby’ positions. 
29 The same applies to the size of contracts. Brokers’ fees for contracts covering 500,000 lots are only marginally higher 
than those for contracts covering 100,000. Minimum contract sizes are in any event prohibitively large for all but the 
largest smallholder organisations. For example, that for coffee Arabica (New York Board of Trade) is 17.5 tons.   17
schemes will be high and there seems no incentive for international traders or credit institutions to 
assume them for third parties without a subsidy (especially given endemic problems of recovering 
credit from producers via crop sales, when markets have been liberalised). Moreover, the logical basis 
of price risk insurance for producers - or put options, which involve the same principle - is not 
obvious. In a Rabobank study (2002), carried out only a few months before this company became the 
executing agent for the World Bank’s pilot schemes, the notion of smallholder price insurance was 
discussed with outright derision: 
 
‘Price risk insurance for producers is not an option. This…was done earlier by governments of some coffee producing 
countries, but in reality this was a subsidy when the price fell…one cannot insure a market price because one cannot 
guarantee a market price. No…mutual insurance can give such a guarantee without making the insurance premium equal 
to the insured deficit…’ 
 
Private and public-private initiatives aimed at ‘fair’, more responsible and more remunerative trade 
Interventions by private actors to promote more responsible and sometimes more remunerative trade 
have increased notably for agro-commodities in recent years. They are found particularly in relation to 
coffee. These interventions are divided more or less evenly between those initiated by private actors 
alone, and those backed also by public agencies. The German bilateral technical assistance 
organisation GTZ has been at the forefront of the latter.  
 
The broad background to these interventions is the rise over the last decade in the importance of new 
‘immaterial’ conventions of coffee quality, already referred to. Amongst these is a sub-convention for 
socio-economically ‘sustainable’ coffee. Definitions of the latter vary according to their emphasis on 
the environmental or the social, and according to the nature of their conceptualisation of social and/or 
environmental dimensions of sustainability.  
 
On the environment side, the two main dimensions stressed by the first generation of conventions in 
this area were the ‘organic’ and ‘shade-growth’. In both cases these were defined by branches of the 
international environmental movement. On the social side, the dimension initially stressed was ‘Fair 
Trade’, as defined by international movements for social justice. ‘Fair Trade’ coffee was defined in 
explicitly anti-market terms, in terms of obligations on producers to be members of cooperative 
organisations and on buyers to supply credit and pay fixed minimum producer prices largely 
independent of the international price.
30 
 
Against this background, roasters, roaster/retailers and roaster/coffee house chains have devised 
alternative sustainability standards, aimed more or less explicitly at deflecting these initiatives. 
Amongst the best known of these is Starbuck’s proprietary ‘Coffee and Farmer Equity Programme’ 
(CAFEP). This grants certain suppliers ‘strategic’ status if they achieve a given level of performance, 
within a points system that rewards social responsibility, environmentally-responsible coffee growing 
and processing systems that conserve water and energy and recycle waste. This status entails enjoying 
purchasing priority over other offers at the same price, as well as (for those achieving especially high 
point scores) commanding a premium over the market price
31 for a maximum period of two years.  
Other procurement-related schemes include that of Nestlé, in collaboration with the ‘Sustainable 
                                                 
30 The prices in question range up to $1.26/lb for Mild Arabicas and $1.41/lb. for organically certified coffee, provided the 
world price does not rise above these levels. In this case a flat rate premium of $0.05/lb is provided. For purposes of 
comparison, in October 2004 the market price for ‘commodity’ coffees was around US$0.60/lb, while the most expensive 
Arabicas traded at around US$1.20/lb. 
31 In a pilot scheme this premium was US$ 0.10/lb, but in later versions of CAFEP this was lowered to US$0.01/lb.  For 
more details see Ponte (2004).   18
Agriculture Initiative Platform’ (SAIP), an organisation backed by a number of large agro-processing 
companies including Danone and Unilever. SAIP has issued a statement calling for an internalisation 
of environmental, social and infrastructural costs into the coffee commodity price, but only gradually 
and via an unelaborated market-based approach. 
 
A somewhat different variety of such proprietory schemes is the ‘Utz Kapeh’ one. This was devised 
by the Dutch roaster/retailer Ahold
32 and focuses upon ‘appropriate’ use of pesticides, protection of 
labour rights and community access to education and health. Utz Kapeh is recognised as Eurepgap 
equivalent and is subscribed to by certain large European retailers other than Ahold, including Casino 
(France) and Safeway (UK). Like the Starbuck scheme it has a schedule of price premiums to reward 
conformity, although these refer to premiums over prevailing market prices,
33 are only advisory and 
seem to be applied only in designated projects.  
 
The widest of all such private initiatives to date is the ‘Common Code for the Coffee Community’ 
(CCCC), supported by Nestlé, Sara Lee, Tchibo, Kraft Foods, a number of NGOs and the IUF. 
Preparations for this Code began in 2002 and were finalised in October 2004. It covers minimum 
wages, child labour, trade union rights and environmental standards on pesticides and water. Like the 
other schemes described, it will be implemented using third-party certifiers. The signatories are not 
committed to buying certified coffee, although they have signed up to ‘intensifying business relations 
with producers of good quality’ and ‘providing a price differential for high quality coffee’ 
(International Herald Tribune, 11 September 2004). 
 
CCCC is sponsored also by the German public development assistance agency GTZ, which in the last 
few years has also supported a series of public-private partnerships in the Nicaraguan cocoa and the 
Vietnamese and Peruvian coffee sectors (GTZ 2003a,b; Ackermann 2001). Both coffee cases involve 
global private companies, namely Jacobs Coffee (Kraft Foods), Douwe Egberts (Sara Lee). In two 
instances a specific locality was chosen where production quality was upgraded through specialised 
extension provision and development of new quality control procedures. The Peruvian project 
involves developing (though not implementing) new quality standards and instruments for the coffee 
sector as a whole.  
 
As noted above proprietary schemes such as these took off only after – and arguably in reaction to – 
initiatives like Fair Trade labelling, which threatened non-subscribers with the reputation of unfair 
trade. The extent of global players’ commitment to their formal principles is questionable.
34  In 
addition, where they entail real actions, most of them fall as obligations on producers, who in return 
get little more back than somewhat greater security in the status that they have already. In most cases, 
they also have to bear new certification costs. Secondly, these initiatives are skewed heavily toward 
estate production, with little attention to smallholders. And thirdly, they involve an extension of the 
general trend toward standards proliferation, which leaves producers facing escalating conformity 
                                                 
32 At a later stage, Ahold began describing the scheme as a product of Guatemalan farmer organizations as well as itself. 
The ‘enrollment’ of farmer organizations is a common feature of the latest generation of proprietary initiatives (Daviron & 
Ponte 2005). 
33 US$0.07/lb for washed Arabicas, but only when the average Arabica price falls below US$0.70/lb.. The recommended 
Robusta premium is US$60/ton unwashed and US$100/ton washed, but again only when the market falls below 
US$650/ton. 
34 See for example Ackermann’s (2003) discussion of Jacobs’ Peruvian project in the GTZ house journal Akzente Focus, 
where the author asks ‘ …is it only a coincidence that, at Jacobs …PPP concepts are developed in the PR department? 
Other departments are far less concerned with them…’ 
   19
costs and leaves consumers increasingly confused. CCCC has a somewhat more ambiguous relation to 
proliferation, since it aims at becoming a hegemon amongst sustainability standards. 
 
An alternative agenda? 
 
Renewed international commodity agreements, global regulation of oligopolistic behaviour through 
competition law, elimination of subsidies to Northern producers of tropical crops, support to market 
coordination in producing countries and action on the demand side in the North are five of the main 
proposals for dealing with the commodity question that have circulated in recent years on the fringes 
of the donor community, amongst NGOs and amongst more heterodox policy researchers. Given the 
rather unpromising nature of much of the mainstream donor agenda, and of the funding levels for its 
more promising components, it is important to provide an evaluation of these alternative proposals. 
 
Renewed international commodity agreements 
A proposal to revive the International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) that governed trade in coffee, 
cocoa, sugar, tin and natural rubber between the 1960s and the end of the 1980s has been made by, 
amongst others, Oxfam (e.g., 2002). The original generation of these Agreements arose against the 
background of a broad (though not general)
35 consensus that action was necessary in relation to the 
already-evident long-term decline in the barter terms of trade of primary commodities relative to 
manufactures. GATT waivers for such agreements were obtained already in the mid-1950s and their 
establishment was UNCTAD’s cause célèbre for the first two decades of its existence.
36 
 
Producing country export monopolies were one set of parties to the agreements, while consuming 
country governments were the other. Under the agreements, recommended or support prices were 
established and defended, either on the basis of setting producing country export quotas or via the 
financing of centrally-held buffer stocks. Price levels above the recommended price were achieved for 
a substantial majority of the lives of the coffee and rubber agreements, and for around half the life of 
the cocoa and sugar ones. According to Hermann, Burger & Smit (1993), at least one of the 
agreements (that for coffee) persistently raised prices by 24-30% over what otherwise would have 
been market-clearing levels. In any event, over the six years following the collapse of the ICAs for 
coffee and cocoa, international prices for these products fell between 60 and 65% (Gibbon & Ponte 
2005). 
 
The apparent success of the ICAs in pushing commodity prices higher became a growing source of 
tension between the two main sets of parties to the Agreements. Consuming countries never wholly 
accepted that they should be used to defend specific long-term floor prices, let alone push prices 
higher. In addition there were fundamental problems in securing agreement between, or even the 
participation of, all major supplying countries. Critical issues here were how to deal with new players 
who had entered the world market in order to exploit the price improvements attained as a result of 
the Agreements, and side-selling outside them by producing countries that were signatories (Payer 
1975, Gilbert 1996, Bates 1997). According to Maizels (2000) total volumes of world commodity 
exports increased by 40% during the 1980s, despite a series of functioning export quota and buffer 
                                                 
35 The IMF never accepted that there were grounds for their existence, even though it created a finance facility to assist 
member governments pay their subscriptions. 
36 In 1976 agreement was finally reached in UNCTAD on creating a Common Fund for Commodities, whose main task 
was envisaged as acting as a central financing facility for further ICAs (although it never acted as this).   20
stock schemes. None of the agreements in question, apart from that for rubber
37, was able to survive 
the end of the 1980s.  
 
The two most obvious questions raised by the proposal to revive ICAs are whether consuming 
countries would sign up to them, and whether producing countries still could operate export quotas. A 
third question concerns the relationship today between export quota schemes and the coffee price. 
 
Certainly, consuming countries have evinced little interest in this proposal. This reflects the fact that 
the grounds have largely disappeared on which they accepted the desirability of the original 
generation of Agreements. These were to a high degree geo-political. They rested in the short-term on 
widespread fears concerning the vulnerability of the ‘West’ to economic blackmail by ‘strategic 
commodity producers’, against the background of concerns about the finite nature of global 
commodity supplies. In the longer term, they reflected fears of a link between this possibility and that 
of a general political re-alignment of developing countries behind the USSR and its allies (Krasner 
1973, Payer op. cit.). Today, only hydro-carbons amongst commodities are considered of strategic 
significance or subject to pressing concerns about finite supply. Opportunities for other commodities 
to be used strategically by producing countries in relation to developed ones have been undermined by 
widespread substitution and by the shift of a wide range of commodity processing industries to 
developing countries themselves. At the same time, with the end of the Cold War, no systematic 
political re-alignment of developing countries is considered likely. 
 
As for producing countries, a widespread revolution has occurred in national market organisation in 
the wake of the widespread adoption of structural adjustment policies. The national marketing boards 
and export monopolies that previously, for good and bad, coordinated input credit and distribution, 
quality control and export sales, have been liquidated or privatised. Most national supply markets are 
relatively competitive and some are extremely competitive in character. Except in a handful of cases, 
little or no coordination exists or – in the absence of a strong policy initiative in this direction – even 
seems possible. If there is no national market coordination, then there can be no meaningful national 
commitments to action in the context of new ICAs. 
 
These problems are clearly visible in relation to the succession of recent attempts in the coffee sector 
to re-launch looser or more indirect forms of international agreement. The ‘Association of Coffee 
Producing Countries’, formed in 1990, introduced a voluntary quota-based programme. This had 
some apparent initial success but in 1999 had to be renegotiated as Brazil radically exceeded its quota. 
Later the programme was abandoned. In 2001-02 the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) – the 
intergovernmental organisation which administered the former international agreement on coffee – 
introduced a global programme (the Coffee Quality-Improvement Programme or CQP) aimed at 
taking very low quality coffee
38 out of the international market, mainly through export restraints on 
the producing country side but also on the basis of efforts to eliminate such coffees from consuming 
country markets. According to the ICO, the CQP was hampered by a lack of agreement on target 
quality standards, and by the partly related absence of some key consuming countries from 
membership of ICO. The lack of agreement amongst producing countries was reflected in the fact that 
far from all introduced national regulations backing the measure. Some consuming countries, notably 
                                                 
37  The apparently outstanding success of the INRA for producing countries is somewhat misleading, however. INRA’s 
recommended price for natural rubber is not set oligopolistically but is linked to the open market price for synthetic 
rubber.  
38 The quality criterion agreed was defect counts above 86 per 300 gm. for Arabica and 150 per 300 gm. for Robusta. 
There were also moisture content restrictions of <8% and >12.5%.   21
the US (which was not an ICO member) objected in principle to the mandatory nature of the CQP, 
and apparently considered the announced quality targets too stringent. In 2004, as a condition of 
getting the US to rejoin ICO, the organisation made implementation of the CQP voluntary for member 
countries and issued a statement ‘clarifying the central role of the ICO as a forum for discussions and 
exchange of information that may affect trade in coffee, without prejudice to the role of other 
institutions such as the WTO’ (ICO, 2004). 
 
In any event, the question arises of whether export restraints would any longer have much impact on 
the market price for coffee. In the absence of state marketing boards who can undertake or support 
finance of producer country stocks, large private producers in supplying countries have taken to 
hedging their own stocks in futures and options markets. This means that the effect of the existence of 
this coffee will be transferred to the market in price terms, even if the stocks themselves are 
physically withheld. This reinforces the argument that, in order for any kind of international action by 
producers to be possible, national market coordination mechanisms must be re-established first 
 
Global regulation of oligopolistic behaviour 
Over the last few years both development NGOs and policy researchers have raised the possibility of 
using competition/antitrust regulation at a multilateral level (principally through WTO) to address 
certain trade problems facing developing countries. The larger part of this discussion has focussed on 
using multilateral antitrust regulation to attack developed country export monopolies or to substitute 
for anti-dumping actions (see Hoekman 1997 for a summary of proposals made in the early 1990s). 
But more recently it has also encompassed claims that multilateral competition regulation could and 
should be used to tackle ‘the exercise of monopsony power by multinational buyers’ of agricultural 
commodities such as coffee and cocoa (Hoekman & Mavroidis 2002). 
 
Hoekman & Mavroidis’s contribution to this debate is broadly typical, in that insofar as the modalities 
of such a use of competition regulation are specified at all, this is in terms of their institutional and 
political prerequisites rather than economic and legal ones. That is, these authors focus on what 
changes it would be necessary to secure within the WTO in order to advance an international antitrust 
agenda, rather than on developing economic criteria for identifying the exercise of monopsony power 
or on exploring what types of legal reasoning could serve as a basis for action in relation to it. Until 
this occurs it is likely that the proposal, while extremely attractive in important respects, will remain a 
non-starter. 
 
As noted earlier, certain economic criteria (and related measurement methodologies) are available for 
identifying the exercise of monopoly/monopsony power, including relation of final prices to marginal 
costs and degrees and directions of price transmission.
39 Currently, the use of these in relation to agro-
commodity monopsonies is hampered by the absence of distinct data series for processors’ output 
prices. As certain researchers, notably Ponte, have succeeded in collecting a restricted set of firm-
level data of this kind, there are no grounds for believing that this is an insuperable obstacle. There is 
a need for a very high degree of data disaggregation even at this level however, if the proposition of 
roaster’s rent capture via varietal substitution is to be properly tested.  
 
A wider question is the relation between demonstration of anti-competitive behaviour in an 
econometric sense and legal judgements concerning anti-competitive behaviour. This may be less of 
an issue in a scenario in which WTO administers global antitrust regulation, since WTO has recently 
                                                 
39 Other measures used by econometricians include levels of entry and exit within a given sector, and degree of own-label 
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taken to using econometric evidence within the dispute settlement mechanism. But such evidence is 
used only very infrequently in the implementation of national antitrust laws, which in any event 
appear to incorporate criteria of anti-competitiveness based mainly on observed evidence about (a 
limited range of) types of actions by individual firms, rather than on the structural characteristics of 
given markets. This is particularly the case in EU regulation, where the chief focus is on actions 
affecting competitors’ welfare (US law is somewhat wider, with competition generally and consumer 
welfare being taken as priorities, although - as will be seen - this is potentially double-edged). 
Widening asymmetry of power between product suppliers and product processors, based on behaviour 
by processors that is best described as incremental and mimetic opportunism rather than collusion, is 
difficult to frame as an antitrust issue within these (especially the EU) legal traditions. 
 
Papadopoulou-Zavalis (2004) summarises the main provisions of EU competition law in terms of 
prohibitions against a menu of actions undertaken on the basis of collusion between firms, against a 
similar range of actions taken by a single firm enjoying a ‘dominant market position’, and against 
mergers likely to lead to the creation of a dominant market position by a single firm. In the first two 
cases, the main actions prohibited in relation to suppliers are fixing purchasing prices, fixing physical 
quotas for specific suppliers, fixing price disparities between different supply markets and fixing 
trading conditions including payment and credit terms. Currently, the framework of reference for 
these prohibitions is always specific national consumption markets – or regional in the case of the EU. 
To be relevant to the problems of global agro-commodity trade, this would have to be widened to the 
global market (raising the issue of how this might occur). Once this is done, there remains the issue of 
identifying hard evidence of abuse. While there is widespread anecdotal evidence of the presence of at 
least some of these actions in global agro-commodity markets, legally-relevant evidence of them is 
hard to come by. Even if it is produced, it also has to be demonstrated that the action in question was 
exceptional in relation to existing market norms. As for actions undertaken by firms acting alone in 
situations of dominant market position, these can only be considered if there is clear evidence that a 
dominant market position is occupied. In EU law this is deemed a reasonable ‘presumption’ only 
where the firm’s relevant market share is 75% or higher. A share of 40-50% is ‘strong evidence’, but 
needs complementing by other data. If a firm has a share of 25% or below, it is presumed unlikely to 
hold a dominant market position. 
 
Under the so-called ‘rule of reason’ doctrine, US law can also consider levels of competition in 
relation to issues of consumer interest and wider welfare outcomes. However, this doctrine appears to 
be employed most frequently to permit certain types of action that might otherwise be considered anti-
competitive, rather than to widen the range of actions that could be considered illegal.  
 
A final problem of existing bodies of competition law concerns the remedies that are available under 
them (Papadopoulou-Zavalis, op. cit.). The most usual of these are fines collected by national 
authorities from companies found to have acted abusively. In the case of proposed mergers that can 
lead to a dominant market position, the most usual remedy is prohibition of the merger or (more 
frequently) actions ordered to dilute its effects. While there are possibilities to make orders for 
restitution/compensation in relation to collusion between firms and abuse of dominant market 
position, these have been employed only rarely. The question is therefore how developing country 
producers could benefit from these remedies, other than through their deterrent effects. 
 
Given this range of difficulties, it is worth asking whether some of the desired outcomes of (creating 
and) using global competition law might be achieved more expeditiously by other means. If the 
problem’s kernel is not market concentration as such, but opportunistic behaviour that becomes   23
rapidly generalised in situations of market concentration, then another option may be to seek to 
directly regulate opportunism. One way of doing so would be to introduce requirements for greater 
corporate transparency in consuming countries. In the case of coffee, where opportunism takes the 
form of substitution by roasters of higher by lower quality varieties coffees and disguising this process 
through steam cleaning, obligations could be introduced on roasters to label the final blended product 
with its precise varietal composition, and with a declaration divulging whether any of the coffee 
entering the blend has been steam cleaned. Legally, these requirements would have a similar status to 
those in the EU requiring labelling of GMO products/products with GM ingredients. 
 
Of course, this is unlikely to have the same implications for processors as requirements for GM 
labelling, at least in the short-term. This is a result a very low levels of public awareness of 
differences between types of coffee – an awareness that has increased only slightly with the rise of 
‘coffee house’ culture. Product differentiation in the coffee house segment has been largely on the 
basis of different types of coffee drink (espresso, latte, macchiato, etc) rather than on the basis of bean 
variety.
40 For transparency requirements to have any impact, they must be linked to actions on the 
demand side (see below). 
 
Elimination of subsidies to/buying out Northern producers of tropical crops 
In April 2004 Brazil won a landmark case on cotton subsidies against the US in the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism.
41 This will hopefully open the door for a case against the EU, the other major 
Northern subsidiser of cotton production
42. EU subsidies on a unit value basis are around three times 
higher than those of the US, although the US’s aggregate level of subsidy was US$2.3 bn. in 2001/02 
as opposed to US$0.7 bn. in the EU (ICAC 2000). Gillson et. al. (op. cit.) review six studies carried 
out between 2001 and 2003, estimating the effects of the removal of all cotton subsidies on world 
prices. These use different estimation levels and have slightly different assumptions, but all predict 
increases in world prices, at a median level of around 13%. Gillson et. al.’s own estimation, assuming 
world market demand fragmentation along varietal lines and differential supply elasticities on the 
producing country side, is an increase of 28%. Even when an undifferentiated world market and 
uniform supply elasticity are assumed, an increase of 18% is estimated. This range of estimates is 
equivalent to an increase of income for all developing country suppliers between US$ 0.6 bn. and 
US$3.3 bn., and for West and Central African countries alone between US$0.09 bn. and US$ 0.4 bn. 
This represents an increase in income from cotton of between 9.8% and 37.4% of their 2002 export 
earnings. The removal of US and EU subsidies alone is estimated to generate an increase in their 
earnings in the range of 8%-29%. 
 
Cotton represents a unique case, both because of the high aggregate level of world subsidies and 
because (unlike in the case of sugar) there are no developing countries that benefit indirectly from the 
subsidies paid in Northern countries. Since it is significant for the livelihoods of such large numbers 
of developing country producers, particularly in Africa, it is nevertheless important to stress the 
significance of elimination of subsidies for this crop as part of any new policy agenda in relation to 
agro-commodities. This point is reinforced by the fact that, in their 2003 proposal to the WTO Trade 
                                                 
40 As Daviron & Ponte (op. cit.) point out, this range of drinks all use commodity Robusta as a common base. On the other 
hand, they come with a large service component. 
41 The ruling was that, even though new subsidies introduced by the US after 1992 were technically de-coupled, they still 
provided a calaculable incentive for production and were hence trade-distorting. 
42 If Turkey is also considered as a Northern country, then it is remaining developed country subsidizer. Other major 
subsiders in 2001/02 (in rank order by aggregate subsidy level) were China with US$1.2 bn., and Mexico with US$0.15bn 
(ICAC op. cit.)   24
Negotiation Committee for a new initiative on cotton, 16 West and Central African countries 
described the elimination of subsidies for cotton production and export as their ‘only specific interest’ 
in the Doha Round.  
 
Because the removal of subsidies is likely to make virtually all EU cotton production and a very 
considerable proportion of US cotton production economically unviable, it is clear that there will be a 
political temptation to re-introduce support in new guises requiring new and probably protracted 
WTO challenges. Arguably therefore, assurance of long-term conformity to WTO rulings in this area 
is best secured by the accompaniment of the implementation of dispute settlement findings with other, 
more radical measures. 
 
In the context of the EU CAP, the case has been made repeatedly since the mid-1960s that only 
buying out EU farm operators offers the possibility of permanently de-coupling subsidies from 
production.  This idea acquired its currently most popular form, in Tangermann’s (1991) proposal for 
a bond scheme. A scheme of this kind, he argued, could allow thorough-going reform to be fully 
embraced, on the basis of compensating farm businesses for policies that led them to invest unwisely, 
and preventing a rash of bankruptcies in the wake of liberalisation. The proposal was taken up briefly 
by the EU Commission but dropped in 1992 in the wider context of the rejection of the MacSharry 
reforms. It began to be raised again by academic commentators following the dilution of the Agenda 
2000 reform proposal in 1999. The most detailed bond scheme proposal in recent years (including full 
costings) is that by Beard and Swinbank (2001). They propose a scheme involving unconditional 
payments over a ten year period, in the form of transferable bonds, guaranteed by the EU alongside 
other government debt, and tradable on EU stock markets. This would replace all existing 
compensation payment systems, support programmes and export subsidies. The consequences are 
described as likely to include lower land prices, lower entry barriers to farming and greater freedom of 
restructuring. 
 
In the case of the EU the main justification made for a bond-based buy-out was that it could be 
represented as a payment by consumers to producers against the probability of lower prices, thus 
leaving no-one worse off. Given that such a scheme will raise cotton prices rather cause them to drop, 
its natural justification in this case is as compensation to developing country producers for damage to 
their export earnings caused by Northern subsidies. If the principle of compensation of developing 
country cotton producers is accepted as part of an eventual Doha Round agreement (this was the 
second component of the West and Central African cotton initiative of 2003) then a scheme of this 
kind could represent the compensation modality most easily saleable in the North. 
 
In the longer-term, it is also important that the issue of subsidies to Southern producers is addressed. 
The great bulk of these subsidies are paid out in better-off developing countries and also result in loss 
of export earnings by low income country producers. As noted above, China is a major user of cotton 
subsidies and Mexico a significant one. Direct support to producers, though at a lower rate, is also 
provided by at least Brazil and Egypt (Valderrama 1999). A similar picture applies in the case of 
coffee. According to Lewin, Giovannucci & Varangis (op. cit. 81), the Brazilian government granted 
soft loans to coffee operators worth Real 0.8 bn. (ca. US$0.26 bn.) in 2002/03 and 2003/04 alone, to 
finance stock retention, farm maintenance and crop husbandry. These loans have been rolled over in 
the wake of falling international prices, despite the fact that much Brazilian production is profitable 
even at these levels. In addition, the Brazilian government absorbed the losses from a put option 
scheme it had offered to large operators, when international prices fell below the value of the options.   25
In both the cases of Brazil and Vietnam, governments further subsidised the opening up the new 
production zones which today form the backbones of the national industries.  
 
Support to public-private market coordination in producing countries and simplification of 
smallholder compliance with new product standards 
Three public goods are particularly significant for smallholder production of coffee and cotton in 
tropical countries: input credit systems, quality control systems and producer payment systems 
reflecting quality. Prior to market liberalisation in the 1980s, most public marketing institutions 
supplied at least the first two of these goods – although usually in costly, inefficient and often corrupt 
ways. Where the third was not provided, typically another public good (e.g., inter-seasonal price 
stabilisation) was provided instead. Input credit systems are critical because smallholders typically 
lack the means to purchase the inputs necessary to grow crop of good quality, at the stage of the crop 
production cycle when they most need to be applied. Quality control systems were (and usually 
remain) critical because crop is marketed accorded to varietal or national reputation. Producer 
payment systems reflecting quality are critical because they provide producers with incentives to 
internalise quality considerations in their own production processes.  
 
There are good reasons why such public goods often cease to be supplied in context of market 
liberalisation. Input credit is not supplied because smallholders have the freedom to sell to whom they 
please, regardless of who they received credit from. Quality control systems break down because 
private operators believe that, if they reject crop on quality grounds, smallholders will instead sell to 
those operators making no such demands. Payment systems reflecting quality break down in 
consequence. 
 
While the over-riding importance of national and varietal reputations is waning in the bulk coffee 
market, what are perceived as ‘basic’ quality attributes (specific defect count and moisture levels) 
remain important and constitute a dividing line between the anonymous and non-anonymous bulk 
trade. At the same time, the global market has segmented between these ‘bulk’ markets and those for 
a heterogeneous group of so-called ‘specialty’ coffees. The latter include a large majority of Columbia 
Milds but also coffees of other varieties, to which immaterial attributes (and additional service 
provisions) can be attached. Amongst these is Fair Trade, but also organic, shade-grown, region or 
estate of origin or simply ‘gourmet’ coffees – all of which command substantial premiums. A novel 
feature of the quality conventions attached to these designations is that they are process-based rather 
than referring to the physical characteristics of the crop. As a result they require new and generally 
expensive methods of verification.  
 
Cotton entails a very different story. The international cotton trade is still organised in a single non-
anonymous market, bifurcated between ‘coarse’ and finer cottons. These are differentiated in relation 
to each other and internally according to globally recognised national origins and quality descriptions. 
‘National origins’ are a summary of varietal characteristics, typical forms of harvesting and types of 
ginning, while quality still refers in large part to those physical properties of the crop that reflect 
husbandry practices, such as contamination levels. Global reference prices exist for finer upland 
cottons and for coarser non-upland ones (the A and B indexes). Besides being dependent on 
supply/demand balances, the spread of premiums between different national origins and grades is 
subject to change on the basis of shifts in the reputation of national origins. In short, traditional 
product-based quality conventions still prevail, with relatively cheap forms of verification.
43 
                                                 
43 The growing importance of ‘High Volume Instrument’-measured qualities of cotton fibre complicates this story 
somewhat, but does not invalidate it. See Larsen (2004).   26
 
In reaction to the breakdown of quality conformity systems in producing countries, international 
traders have often turned to tighter forms of vertical integration. In the case of coffee this typically 
takes the form of buying from estates, which can be considered insulated from the generally 
prevailing market chaos and enjoy major economies of scale in meeting new quality conventions. In 
the case of cotton, where potentially large producers are often absent, this typically takes the form of 
outgrower schemes. These twin trends both pose the issue of keeping smallholders ‘in the system’, but 
in different ways. In the case of cotton, where economies of scale in meeting the prevailing quality 
requirements are low, smallholders will be kept in the system provided that outgrowers and other 
buyers can find ways of competing that do not lead to side-selling by producers - and which at the 
same time provide the latter with incentives to increase acreages and improve yields and quality. The 
alternative here is decline of national reputation and national marginalisation in the global market. In 
the case of coffee, smallholders will only get back into the system if ways can be found that reduce 
their costs of quality conformity. 
 
Larsen (2004) and Poulton et al (2004) argue that cotton systems with the characteristics described 
emerge most clearly after liberalisation where the market is dominated by a handful of relatively large 
players who agree to compete on the basis of a near-formal set of rules, and who have an institutional 
mechanism for identifying and acting on instances of opportunistic horizontal competition. They 
identify such systems as present in Zimbabwe (prior to 2002) and Zambia, but absent in four other 
southern and eastern African countries. In Zimbabwe and Zambia such systems emerged on the basis 
of liberalisation being managed in hands-on ways, but – although this may be harder – they do not 
exclude market coordination emerging through other initiatives. There is a role for donors in 
providing technical assistance to assist such initiatives, although a central problem here is identify and 
develop institutional mechanisms which are likely to have credibility amongst private stakeholders. 
This has not been the case with a number of the initiatives sponsored by the multilateral Common 
Fund for Commodities, which appear to be mainly dedicated to reviving state-led sector coordination.  
 
In the coffee sector the most notable initiatives to simplify smallholder conformity with new product 
standards are found in relation to organic certification. Here the international umbrella organic 
movement, IFOAM – with cooperation from certain international certification agencies have designed 
certification processes specifically tailored to smallholder organisations. These involve the training 
and use of smallholder organisation internal auditors and inspection of smallholder organisation 
members by international certifiers on a sample basis. The EU now advises member states to consider 
recognising such schemes in granting import authorisations, but they are not obliged to and some 
apparently do not. More importantly, their implementation assumes the existence of well-functioning 
and well-resourced smallholder organisations. This suggests that assisting smallholder organisations 
to attain these properties is a pre-condition of other actions. It goes without saying that another pre-
condition will be securing access to credit and inputs (whether conventional or certified ‘sustainable’ 
in one form or another). The central issue that this raises is whether such organisations, credit 
systems, etc. can come into existence or remain viable without donor support. Meanwhile, outside of 
the organic sub-sector there are few or no generic systems providing alternative mechanisms for 
attaining conformity, only a myriad of disconnected projects. This reflects the often proprietary nature 
of the quality conventions they refer to and may result in ‘competency traps’ for beneficiaries. 
 
Actions on the demand side in Northern countries 
The importance of action on the demand side in North has been emphasised strongly by Daviron & 
Ponte (op. cit.) in the case of coffee. As already noted, it is a pre-condition for the effectiveness of   27
action to take advantage of measures to enhance the transparency of roasters’ descriptions of the final 
product. According to these authors  
 
‘…the most problematic aspect (of the current situation) is that consumers do not know how to assess coffee quality. They 
simply do not have the knowledge and language to discern the many characteristics of coffee…(whereas) a consumer who 
knows how to discern the intrinsic qualities of coffee will look for particular kinds of coffee and be willing to pay more for 
them…’ (Ch. 7)  
 
On the other hand, this resembles the situation in the wine sector in most Anglophone countries as 
recently as 20 years ago. Here, a ‘wine bar culture’ (that has now vanished in favour of a coffee house 
one) provided the foundation for a generalisation of knowledge concerning regional appellations and 
their special properties, varieties of grape, the different components of wine appearance and taste and 
which wines are best to drink with different foods - or without food. With support from ICO, 
international NGOs and governments of producing countries, initiatives to ‘deepen’ coffee 
consumption appear both useful and promising. 
 
On the other hand, initiatives to broaden coffee consumption appear to be also necessary. Overall 
consumption is declining in mature markets, especially amongst the young and in favour of soft 
drinks that require no preparation. Alcoholic drinks have become more popular amongst this age-
group on the basis of a cross-over with soft drinks (‘alco-pops’) and there may be some mileage for 




The conceptual formulation of the commodity question has changed somewhat in recent years, as 
have the policy instruments proposed to deal with it. The issue of oligopoly, once seen as a problem 
of producing countries (and their marketing boards), is now seen increasingly as a problem for them. 
The new elements of the mainstream policy agenda (PRM and PPPs) simply do not address this issue, 
though. 
 
Nor, it must be said, do they address another element of the contemporary commodity question which 
is becoming increasingly evident. The question is becoming more and more one about smallholders. 
Large-estate commodity production has fared much better than smallholder production since the 
advent of structural adjustment, partly because estates alone now enjoy economies of scale and partly 
because of the evaporation of many of the sources of competitive advantage that smallholders once 
enjoyed – such as conventions of quality that rewarded land husbandry based on hand-cultivation and 
mixed cropping, as well as ability to exercise detailed control over labour. At the same time, countries 
with smallholder-based systems, because they are poorer and less economically diversified, have been 
much more exposed to the commodity crisis than ones where large estates play the leading role. These 
two facts have substantial implications for the breadth of associated economic problems and the depth 
of their impacts on livelihoods. 
 
Those elements of the current mainstream agenda carried over from earlier periods, namely 
compensatory finance and support for diversification, remain relevant although there is room for 
improvement in their funding levels and in their precise focus and design. At the same time, there are 
some elements of the ‘alternative’ agenda which are impractical and unrealistic. New ICAs and a 
global competition law which could make a difference in relation to buyer oligopoly fall into this 
category. New ways of regulating and balancing market power must be found. But better places to 
look for them are interventions that scale-up the competitiveness and bargaining power of   28
smallholders at national level in producing countries, target the market distortions which bolster the 
position of large-scale (including Northern) producers, and impose new obligations of transparency on 
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